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How the concept of essential elements of a legislative act continues to elude
the Court. Parliament v. Council
Case C-355/10, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union,
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 5 September 2012, nyr.
I. Introduction
Although this case relates to the pre-Lisbon comitology regime, the question
put to the Court is also of vital importance for the post-Lisbon regime of
delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU. This provision prescribes that the
dividing line between (formal) legislation and delegated acts corresponds to
the dividing line between the essential and non-essential elements of
legislation, whereby delegated acts can only deal with non-essential elements.
The distinction between essential and non-essential elements was already
present in the old comitology regime, ever since the Köster case. It was also a
cornerstone of the 2006 amendment of the second comitology decision, which
introduced the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (PRAC) providing for a
substantial increase in the Parliament’s power compared to the then existing
comitology procedures, although it still did not put it on par with the Council
as Article 290 TFEU now does.1
In the present case, the Parliament challenged a decision of the Council,
adopted under the PRAC, implementing the Schengen Borders Code (SBC)
because the decision allegedly touched upon essential elements of the SBC.2
Article 12(5) of SBC,3 the enabling clause of the contested decision, provides
that “[a]dditional measures governing surveillance may be adopted. Those,
designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by
supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory
procedure with scrutiny.” Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
1. To be precise, Art. 290 TFEU puts the Parliament virtually on par with the Council. See
Driesen, “Delegated legislation after the Treaty of Lisbon: An analysis of Art. 290 TFEU”, 35
EL Rev. (2010), 847.
2. Decision (EU) 2010/252 of the Council supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as
regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, O.J. 2010, L 111/20.
3. Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen
Borders Code) O.J. 2006, L 105/1.
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the references to the PRAC in the existing legislation are being amended and
replaced with references to Article 290 TFEU and in the future the additional
measures under Article 12(5) SBC will therefore be adopted by the
Commission through delegated acts.4 It is therefore clear that the implications
of the Court’s ruling in this case go far beyond the implementation of the SBC.
2. Factual and legal background
The rules contained in the contested decision had been adopted to streamline
Frontex operations. Frontex is the EU agency responsible for supporting the
Member States in the management of the external borders, and has the
competence to coordinate border surveillance operations by the Member
States. Border surveillance itself is defined in the SBC as “the surveillance of
borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border
crossing points outside the fixed opening hours, in order to prevent persons
from circumventing border checks”; its main purpose is “to prevent
unauthorized border crossings, to counter cross-border criminality and to take
measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally”. Examples of
Frontex’ coordinated operations are Poseidon and Hermes.5
In its operations at the EU’s southern border (i.e. the Mediterranean Sea),
Frontex has been confronted with boat refugees, persons often in distress and
requiring assistance. This led to a number of problems since Frontex had not
been established as a search and rescue agency and the different Member
States cooperating in Frontex missions interpret the relevant rules of
international law, inter alia the principle of non-refoulement, differently.
Commonly agreed rules at EU level on what to do in such situations were
therefore necessary. Because these problems arose during border surveillance
operations, which are foreseen in Article 12 SBC, the Commission proposed
to use Article 12(5) SBC to adopt these rules and presented a draft decision to
this end to the relevant comitology committee. The draft did not acquire the
4. The Commission has already made a proposal to update the SBC and replace the
references to the PRAC with references toArt. 290TFEU. See European Commission, Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No
562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and the
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, COM(2011)118 final.
5. The Poseidon operation targets the illegal migration at the Turkish-Greek Border. The
Hermes operation was initiated at the request of Italy because of the large influx of
North-African immigrants around the isle of Lampedusa.
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needed support within the Committee, which meant that the Commission,
under the PRAC rules, forwarded its draft to the Council.6
Under the heading “interception”, the Commission’s draft proposed
important material rules by listing the measures which could be taken during
an interception, inter alia the possibility to board, search and seize a ship,
apprehend the people on board or order it to modify its course, conducting it
to a third country or a Member State participating in the Frontex operation.
The draft further provided that if the ship were to be in the territorial waters or
contiguous zone of a Member State, or if the ship flies the flag of a Member
State or if it is suspected of having the nationality of a Member State and this
in an Exclusive Economic Zone or the High Seas, these measures would have
to be taken under the instructions of that Member State.
Under the heading “search and rescue operations”, units participating in the
Frontex operation were to be obliged to provide assistance to any vessel or
person in distress at sea and contact the relevant Rescue Coordination Centre.
Under the heading “disembarkation”, the draft provided that the operational
plan which needs to be drawn up for every Frontex operation, pursuant to
Article 8e(1) of the Frontex Regulation,7 would need to spell out the necessary
modalities and that priority should be given to disembarkation in the third
country from where the persons departed, or through whose waters they
transited, or to the geographically closest point where the safety of the
persons is guaranteed. Disembarkation should respect the principle of
non-refoulement (although the Commission merely reproduced the material
content of this principle, without referring to it explicitly) and the persons
concerned should be informed of this so as to give them the opportunity to
provide the participating units with reasons for which they believe they would
be subject to inhumane treatment in the proposed place of disembarkation.
The actual decision adopted by the Council largely took over the
Commission’s draft, except for the following points: the rules proposed by the
Commission were split up in two parts in the annex between (binding) rules
and non-binding guidelines. The headings “search and rescue” and
“disembarkation” were moved to the non-binding part of the annex. The
principle of non-refoulement was however explicitly mentioned and was
reproduced in the binding part of the annex. Units participating in the mission
could also take the measures listed in the annex against vessels flying the flag
6. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision supplementing the Schengen
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, COM(2009)658 final.
7. Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of the Council establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union, O.J. 2004 L 349/1.
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of a third State, subject to the authorization of that State, when the vessel is
situated in the High Seas. Lastly, if disembarkation is not possible in the third
State, the Council provided that priority should be given to disembarkation in
the Member State hosting the joint operation rather than the geographically
closest point (as proposed by the Commission).
Under Article 5a(4) d-e of the Comitology Decision, if the Council
envisages to adopt measures under the PRAC, the European Parliament may
still block this if the proposed measures exceed the implementing powers
granted or if they are incompatible with the aim and/or content of the basic
instrument which is to be implemented or if they are not in accordance with
the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality. The relevant Parliamentary
committee indeed proposed to adopt a Resolution that would block the
adoption of the measures, because they (allegedly) exceeded the scope of the
enabling clause in the basic instrument (in casu Art. 12(5) of the SBC).8
Although many MEPs had reservations, the content of the proposed decision
was viewed as too important and too urgently needed in the field to block its
adoption. The motion for a resolution was therefore rejected in plenary on 25
March 2010. However, the LIBE committee later (10 May 2010) unanimously
requested the Legal Affairs Committee to advise the EP President to start
proceedings before the Court, which it did on 23 June 2010.
The EP put forward three pleas which came down to two major arguments,
firstly the rules laid down in the decision contained “essential elements”
which should have been laid down in the legislation itself and could not have
been the subject of the Commission’s implementing powers. Specifically, the
EP claimed the decision did not merely supplement or amend the
non-essential elements of the Schengen Borders Code as Article 12(5) of
Regulation provided, but added new essential elements (first plea) and altered
existing essential elements (second plea). It is useful in this regard to recall the
recitals to the Comitology Decision which explain that the PRAC should be
applied “for measures of general scope which seek to amend nonessential
elements of a basic instrument adopted in accordance with the [co-decision
procedure], inter alia by deleting some of those elements or by supplementing
the instrument by the addition of new nonessential elements.”9 Under its
second main argument (and third plea) the EP claimed the (implementing)
decision interfered with the (legislative) Frontex Regulation.
8. Motion for a Resolution on the draft Council decision supplementing the Schengen
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, B7-0227/2010, 17 March 2010.
9. Decision (EC) 2006/512 of the Council amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down
the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, O.J.
2006, L 200/11.
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3. The Opinion of theAdvocate General
Advocate General Mengozzi immediately dismissed the plea of
inadmissibility raised by the Council, who argued that the European
Parliament could not challenge the decision and that it should have instead
exercised its veto right under the PRAC procedure. The Advocate General
inter alia referred to the established case law of the Court in which it had held
that the right of action under Article 263 TFEU is not conditional on the
position taken by the applicant in the procedure leading to the adoption of the
contested act (paras. 16–23).
As to the substance of the case, the Advocate General commenced by
recalling the Court’s previous jurisprudence in which the notion of “essential
elements” figured. These were mostly cases related to the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). As regards the essential elements of the SBC, the
Advocate General remarked that the case law of the Court in the sphere of the
CAP should be approached with caution, since the CAP is much more isolated
from issues related to human rights and the EU’s international obligations
than the management of the EU’s external borders.10 As a result, the Advocate
General found that the margin of discretion should be less wide than in the
case of implementation of the CAP (para 32). Whether the measures adopted
by the Council related to non-essential elements of course also depended on
how “additional measures governing surveillance” in Article 12(5) SBC
should be understood. The Parliament understood this as referring to technical
issues, whereas the Council interpreted the legislature’s silence as not
precluding non-technical issues. The Council further argued that because the
SBC’s main focus was on border checks, whilst only laying down the basic
rules governing border surveillance, the legislature had left the power to work
out all other rules as necessary to the Commission, subject to these rules being
in conformity with the basic rules laid down in the SBC. The Commission
similarly argued that the power to add new non-essential elements to
legislation implies the power to impose completely new obligations or
regulate new activities if this is necessary or useful to implement the basic
instrument, as long as this is not contrary to the basic instrument.
The Advocate General had his doubts whether some of the measures
provided for in the binding annex, for example seizing the ship, apprehending
persons on board and conducting the ship to a third country, fell under the
10. However, the CAP is not completely isolated from these issues either. See e.g. the recent
Bonda case in which the question was raised whether the combination of administrative
penalties (provided for in EU legislation) and criminal penalties for making false declarations
in an application for CAP funding, was in violation of the ne bis in idem principle. See Case
C-489/10, Criminal proceedings against Łukasz Marcin Bonda, judgment of 5 June 2012, nyr.
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notion of “border surveillance” as defined by the SBC (para 59). But the
Advocate General felt that these measures related to essential elements of
border surveillance, which should accordingly be laid down in the basic
instrument itself (para 60). The Advocate General reached the same
conclusion for the rules related to interception in the High Seas, which the
Parliament claimed could not fall under border surveillance. According to the
Advocate General, these rules could not have been adopted in any case since
again they related to the essential elements, which should be dealt with in the
basic instrument. In order to come to this conclusion, the Advocate General
relied on three considerations. First, the Advocate General referred to the
“sphere” of which the basic instrument formed part (i.e. the sensitive nature of
border control policy). Secondly, he noted that the notion of surveillance is
fundamental in the sphere of border control. Lastly, the Advocate General
referred to the “strong measures” which the contested decision laid down,
explicitly referring to those under the heading “disembarkation”; the
competence provided to stop, board, search and seize a ship; the possibility of
questioning and apprehending people on board as well as conducting the ship
and the people on board to a Member State or a third country or handing over
the ship and persons on board to the authorities of a third country (para 61).
The Advocate General’s analysis of the other pleas (rejecting the second
and upholding the third plea) will not be dealt with in this note since the Court
did not deal with these pleas.
4. Judgment of the Court
In its ruling, the Court followed the Advocate General on the Council’s plea of
inadmissibility (paras. 37–41). It further followed the Advocate General by
ruling that in order to determine which elements of a matter are essential and
which are not one should “take account of the characteristics and
particularities of the domain concerned.” (para 68) The Court further clarified
that such an assessment does not depend on the view of the legislature alone,
but must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review (para 67).
However, unlike the Advocate General, the Court made a link between
elements which are essential and those which entail political choices, noting
that “provisions which, in order to be adopted, require political choices falling
within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature cannot be
delegated.” (para 65)
The Court then noted that Article 12(4) of the SBC provides that the aim of
“border surveillance” is to apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally,
but that the SBC itself does not contain rules concerning the measures which
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border guards may take when they apprehend such individuals and neither
does the SBC provide for measures to be taken following the apprehension of
such individuals (para 73). The Court thus seemed to express the same doubts
on whether the measures in the contested decision could actually be defined as
measures governing border surveillance. Just like the Advocate General, the
Court did not develop this issue and went on to the question whether the
measures in the contested decision related to the essential elements of the
SBC.
The Court relied on two considerations to answer this question in the
positive. Firstly the Court noted that deciding which enforcement powers
should be exercised by border guards “entails political choices falling within
the responsibilities of the European Union legislature” since it requires
conflicting interests to be weighed up against each other (para 76). The Court
further noted that if enforcement measures are taken against ships, the
exercise of these enforcement powers might interfere with the sovereign rights
of third countries depending on the flag State of the ship. This led the Court to
qualify the rules in the contested decision as “a major development in the SBC
system.” (para 76) Secondly the Court recalled that the powers conferred on
border guards by the contested decision might interfere with the fundamental
rights of the individuals concerned. The Court concluded that the
adoption of the contested decision required “political choices to be
made . . . Accordingly, the adoption of such provisions goes beyond the scope
of the additional measures within the meaning ofArticle 12(5) of the SBC and,
in the context of the European Union’s institutional system, is a matter for the
legislature.” (para 77)
Once the Court determined that the contested decision had indeed added
new essential elements, which should have therefore been included in the
SBC, the decision’s annulment became inevitable. The alleged non-binding
nature of the Guidelines in part II of the Annex could not detract from this as
the Court remarked that the contested decision equally provided that the
Guidelines should form part of the (mandatory) operational plan which is
drawn up each time Frontex coordinates an operation and since that
operational plan should be complied with, the non-binding guidelines had
binding effect (paras. 80–2). Because the Parliament’s first plea was
successful, the Court did not rule on the second and third pleas (para 85).
Since the Parliament did not contest the material rules of the contested
decision (see above) it had requested the Court to maintain the decision’s
effects pursuant to Article 264(2) TFEU until the decision is replaced. Given
the importance of these material rules for the smooth functioning of the
current and future Frontex operations the Court indeed made use of its powers
under Article 264(2) TFEU (paras. 89–90).
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5. Comment
The importance of the first two pleas of the Parliament of course greatly
exceeded that of the present case as they depended upon the fundamental
criterion that the Court first put forward in Köster to distinguish between
legislative and executive powers. In that case, the Court proposed a
Wesentlichkeitskriterium, observing “[i]t is sufficient . . . that the basic
elements of the matter to be dealt with have been adopted in accordance with
the [legislative] procedure.”11 Although this is a very straightforward standard
by which to assess the content of measures under review, its actual application
is less evident. What is “essential” also depends on the area in which the
measures are adopted. In its case law following Köster, the Court has been
especially generous towards the Commission’s implementing powers in the
field of the CAP.12 And although the Court had clarified that this CAP case law
could not simply be transposed onto other sectors,13 it had not offered much
further guidance on the question how to draw the line between essential and
non-essential elements. Even in its distinction between the implementation of
the CAP and non-CAP policies the Court was not completely clear since in its
rulings related to the latter it did not hesitate to cite its rulings related to the
former.14
In his Opinion, the Advocate General noted that the parties to the
proceedings agreed on the importance of the judgment in this case for the
post-Lisbon system of delegated acts. Unfortunately the Court did not seize
this case to offer further guidance on the issue. In this regard it should be noted
that the notion of “essential elements” has acquired an upgraded role under
Article 290 TFEU compared to that under Article 5a of the Comitology
Decision since it is now codified in primary law. In Germany v. Commission
the Court had clarified its ruling in Köster, stating that if the legislature “has
laid down in its basic regulation the essential rules governing the matter in
question, it may delegate to the Commission general implementing power
without having to specify the essential components of the delegated power; for
11. Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster and
Berodt & Co, [1970] ECR 1161, para 6.
12. Bianchi, “La comitologie est morte! vive la comitologie! – Premières réflexions sur
l’exécution du droit de l’Union après le Traité de Lisbonne – L’exemple de la Politique agricole
commune”, 48 RTDE (2012), 88.
13. Case 22/88, Industrie- en HandelsondernemingVreugdenhil BV and Gijs van der Kolk
– Douane Expediteur BV v.Minister van Landbouw enVisserij, [1989] ECR 2049, para 17. See
also Türk, The concept of legislation in European community law: a comparative perspective,
(Kluwer Law International, 2006), p. 229.
14. See e.g. Case C-417/93,European Parliament v.Council of the EuropeanUnion, [1995]
ECR I-1185, para 30; Case C-403/05, European Parliament v. Commission of the European
Communities, [2007] ECR I-9045, para 51.
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that purpose, a provision drafted in general terms provides a sufficient basis
for the authority to act.”15 However, Article 290(1) TFEU now inter alia
provides that “[t]he objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation
of power shall be explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential
elements of an area shall be reserved for the legislative act and accordingly
shall not be the subject of a delegation of power.” The discretion of the
Commission is therefore reduced under the Lisbon Treaty. Not only may the
Commission’s delegated acts not touch upon the essential elements of the
basic instrument, the latter will also need to spell out the objectives, content
and scope of the delegation. These are two requirements that the Court will
ultimately be called upon to scrutinize and which it should develop into a
two-staged test when assessing the exercise of the Commission’s powers
under Article 290 TFEU. Determining the essential elements of a basic
instrument will therefore in the future only be the first step in assessing
whether the Commission has respected the limits to its powers under Article
290 TFEU.
The Court not only failed to clarify this issue, its ruling actually raises more
questions than answers and this despite the interesting propositions made by
the Advocate General. The latter referred to the established case law of the
Court and seemed to infer his three considerations therefrom (see above). The
Advocate General first focused on the subject matter of the basic instrument,
which the contested decision implemented, implying that the scope left for the
adoption of delegated acts diminishes when the policy field concerned is
sensitive or relates to high politics, as was the case in casu. Second, the
Advocate General situated the precise subject matter of the contested decision
within that of the basic instrument, implying that when the former is not
related to the “core” of the latter, the scope for the adoption of delegated acts
becomes greater. In casu, this condition was not met, since border surveillance
is fundamental to border control. Third, the Advocate General referred to the
far-reaching measures which the Council had adopted in its decision.16 This
third element is more debatable, since it would imply that whether an
implementing act relates to the essential elements of the basic instrument or
not, would also depend on the intensity of the measures contained in the
implementing act. In general terms this would mean that the delegate authority
(under Art. 290 TFEU the Commission) could affect the definition of what is
essential in the mandate drawn up by the delegating authority. The reference to
15. Case C-240/90, Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of the European
Communities, [1992] ECR I-5383, para 41.
16. The English language version of the A.G.’s Opinion speaks of “strong measures” but
inter alia the French and German language versions “mesures incisives” or “eingreifende
Maßnahmen” better reflect the original “misure incisive”.
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the intensity of the measures seems therefore out of place in the assessment of
whether these measures form part of the essential elements of the basic
instrument. The argument rather implicitly refers to the proportionality of the
measures in the contested act and the Advocate General seems to suggest that
a stricter proportionality test should be applied by the judiciary when
assessing delegated legislation as opposed to the proportionality test applied
to legislation adopted by the formal legislature.
The Advocate General further built on the existing case law and tried to
construe an argument based on general notions that could offer further
guidance for future cases and for legislative practice. The Court more or less
ignored this part of the Advocate General’s analysis and only referred back to
his Opinion when concluding that the contested decision indeed contained
essential elements of border surveillance (para 79). To come to this conclusion
the Court seemed to propose a new element to determine the essential
elements of a basic instrument, referring multiple times to “political choices”.
Although this is also an abstract notion, it does not bring any useful guidance.
In fact, the Court only rephrases the content of the Treaties. After all, saying
something is an essential element of a basic instrument is similar to saying it
is the result of a political choice. Further, this element is also novel in the
Court’s case law on comitology. When the Court in the past emphasized the
notion of “political choices” this was usually in proceedings whereby the
validity of a legislative act was challenged. The broad discretion, which such
political choices entailed for the legislature, implied that the judicial review
exercised by the Court would be limited to “verifying whether there has been
a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers on the part of the
Community institutions, or whether they have manifestly exceeded the limits
of their discretion.”17
The reference to “political choices” in the present ruling simply rephrases
the original question into when something will or will not be the subject of a
political choice. In casu the Court held that the contested decision entailed
political choices because “it require[d] the conflicting interests at issue to be
weighed up on the basis of a number of assessments.”Again this remark by the
Court is not helpful. If this definition of “political choices” is adopted and if
“political choices” are the reserved domain of the legislature, the possibility
provided by Article 290 TFEU to adopt delegated acts becomes useless. Even
17. Case T-475/07, Dow Agrosciences Ltd v. European Commission, judgment of 9 Sept.
2011, nyr, para 151.
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when non-essential elements of legislation are amended or supplemented
there will always be some conflicting interests which will have to be weighed
up against each other on the basis of a number of considerations.
The Court simply postulated that the adoption of the rules in question
entailed political choices (and therefore contained essential elements) and
therefore did not follow the Advocate General’s example in adopting a more
systematic approach. Whereas the Advocate General’s analysis involved three
steps, the Court got stuck at stage one. As regards the subject matter, the Court
observed that the contested decision laid down rules that could interfere with
the sovereign rights of third countries and with the fundamental rights of
individuals, both being sensitive topics. In this, the Court simply reaffirms that
the policy field and subject matter in which the delegated act should be
situated is an important factor in assessing what the essential elements of the
basic instrument are.
Still, there is one interesting observation of the Court, when it referred to
the issue of fundamental rights. The Court noted that these “may be interfered
with to such an extent [by the contested decision] that the involvement of the
European Union legislature is required.” (para 77) This would imply that
matters involving fundamental rights cannot be dealt with through delegated
acts and that the latter may only marginally touch upon persons’ fundamental
rights.18
6. Conclusion
In the present case the Court missed an opportunity to shed greater light on the
dividing line between essential and non-essential elements of legislation. In its
ruling, the Court merely confirmed that what is “essential” also depends on
the policy field concerned; the new element (i.e. the notion of “political
choices”) introduced by the Court is far from clarifying either. No doubt this
question will come before the Court again, since Article 290 TFEU has now
inscribed this dividing line in primary law to protect the reserved domain of
the legislature. As such, drawing this line will be the first step the Court will
have to undertake in the future to determine whether the Commission has
exercised its powers in conformity with Article 290 TFEU. The second step
will then be to determine whether the basic instrument sufficiently spells out
18. It should be noted that the Court did not lay down an absolute prohibition for delegated
acts to affect persons’ fundamental rights.
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the requirements the Commission needs to observe when exercising its
delegated powers and whether these requirements have been respected. The
Court would therefore not only help the legislature but also itself if it could
work out a more systemic approach to this problem, allowing for greater
predictability and legal certainty.
Merijn Chamon*
* Academic Assistant and PhD researcher European Law, European Institute, Ghent
University (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence).
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